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Subject: Re: Nuclear Power in Australia? Why not?
From: zcbag@cnfd.pgh.wec.com (B. Alan Guthrie)
Date: 21 Mar 1997 14:20:32 GMT
In article <332F9799.250F@worldnet.att.net>,
Dennis Nelson <innrcrcl@worldnet.att.net> wrote:
>B. Alan Guthrie wrote:
>>
>> In article <332A2F43.C7@worldnet.att.net>,
>> Dennis Nelson <innrcrcl@worldnet.att.net> wrote:
>> >B. Alan Guthrie wrote:
>> >>
>> >>
>>
>> <SNIP>
>>
>> >> >
>> >> >This is a myth! Any combination of Pu isotopes can be made into a bomb
>> >> >Pure Pu-239 is, of course, the preference which accounts for the Green
>> >> >Run experiment/release at Hanford which was conducted to test detection
>> >> >methods to determine if the USSR was making plutonium from green fuels by
>> >> >measuring the effluents from their plutonium plants.
>> >> >
>> >> >Bomb designers can compensate for the other isotopes in their products.
>> >> >Pure Pu-239 bombs are safer to produce and handle because of their lower
>> >> >gamma emissions.
>> >> >
>> >>
>> >> No, I cannot make a bomb from pure Pu-240, so your assertion that
>> >> any combination of Pu isotopes can be made into a bomb (I assume
>> >> you mean a nuclear explosive device) is wrong. I remain persuaded
>> >> that any appreciable amount of Pu-240, in excess, say, of roughly
>> >> 20% of the isotopic abundance, will preclude the successful
>> >> construction and detonation of a weapon.
>> >>
>> >> What is a "green fuel?"
>> >>
>> >
>> >
>> >OK, I plead guilty to being imprecise. I did not envision isotope
>> >separation of plutonium when I made the above statement. What I meant,
>> >but was not quite clear enough about, is that any degree of fuel burnup
>> >can be made into a bomb. The shorter time the breeder fertile species
>> >remains in the neutron flux the less plutonium will be created. That
>> >which is created, however, will be mostly Pu-239. If the fuel resides
>> >in the reactor longer there will be more total Pu but the isotopic
>> >composition shifts to the higher Pu isotopes. There is always enough
>> >fissionable isotopes in this gemisch to make a bomb.
>> >
>> >Green fuel is fuel which has remained in the core for less than a month;
>> >sometimes as little as two weeks. Plutonium extracted from this green
>> >fuel is almost pure Pu-239. Pu-240 does not remain constant but is
>> >transformed to Pu-241 and other higher isotopes in a continuous reactor
>> >flux.
>> >
>> >
>>
>> Sorry, I still don't buy it. The triggering of a plutonium bomb
>> is rather difficult. A neutron must be inserted at precisely the
>> correct instant. If it is inserted a little too soon or a little
>> too late, the device will not detonate properly. As more Pu-240
>> is present, one will have more neutrons from spontaneous fission,
>> thereby greatly complicating the bomb design. Maybe a very
>> sophisticated and experienced weapons lab could make a bomb from
>> using plutonium with a relatively large amount of plutonium. Maybe
>> not.
>
>
>I have heard it from the mouth of an eminent bomb designer, Ted Turner.
>Plutonium from spent reactor fuel of any burnup can be made into a bomb.
>Neutron insertion is provided by an initiator "walnut" in the plutonium
>pit. At the same time the implosion crushes the pit, the walnut (which
>consists of Po and Be powders in concentric layers separated by mylar
>or something) is also crushed, mixing the powders and causing a neutron
>burst. This inserts a few "$100" worth of reactivity at precisely the
>moment of maximum compression which detonates the bomb. Kind of like a
>spark plug for the bomb. Random neutron are not a problem as long as
>there are not too many of them.
Last time I looked at Mr. Taylor's work (a couple of years ago), I
formed the distinct impression that he was on a *mission* and was
not willing to let reality interfere. I realize that the same
assertion can be made of me, so you need not make the obvious retort.
Perhaps Mr. Taylor bamboozled you. Inserting neutrons into the
device does not insert reactivity.
>While the odd numbered nuclides could spontaneously fission I doubt that
>applies to Pu-240. Random neutron emissions from fission or any other
>source could pose a problem of premature detonation, decreasing yield.
The spontaneous fission rate for selected isotopes is
Isotope Spontaneous fission
rate, dis/sec per
gram of isotope From
U-235 3.13E-4 W. Myer, S. K. Loyalka,
W. E. Nelson, and R. W.
U-238 6.96E-3 Williams
"The Homemade Nuclear
Pu-239 1.02E-2 Bomb Syndrome"
Nuclear Safety (18)
Pu-240 4.52E+2 July-August, 1977
pp 427 - 438
>> The argument is made that in the early 1960s a device was made using
>> reactor grade plutonium. Upon digging into the matter, I determined
>> that the plutonium in question came from a British power reactor
>> which was graphite moderated. Thus, it is not clear to me whether
>> this plutonium was as contaminated with Pu-240 as LWR fuel at, say,
>> 30,000 MWD/MTU, which is low-burnup these days. Plutonim produced
>> in a graphite reactor will build in Pu-240 less quickly than an
>> LWR at the same burnup. I have a suspicion as well that the
>> British fuel was not at a very high burnup.
>
>
>I fail to see the significance of Pu-240. As long as the odd numbered
>nuclides are there in sufficient numbers you can make a bomb.
The significance of Pu-240 lies in its spontaneous fission neutrons.
The paper referenced above also notes that self-heating of reactor-
grade plutonium from radioactive decay is such that there would be
a 65 deg-C difference in temperature between the surface of the
putative device and the ambient air, thereby introducing other
difficulties in the design of the device.
This paper also addresses the issues raised by Taylor.
>> Also, the US Department of Energy several years ago solicited
>> reactor designs for the inceneration of plutonium. The purpose
>> of these designs was to burn plutonium; the production of electricity
>> was an additional benefit. Fuel cycle costs were not a major
>> factor in the evaluation of the designs. A criterion of the
>> design spec was that the plutonium was to be burned such that
>> the isotopics were equivalent to PWR fuel at about 27,000 MWD/MTU.
>> I interpret this specification to mean that such isotopics are
>> unusable for weapons.
>
>
>
>Don't think so. It is probably more disinformation to convince the public
>that building reactors and shipping nuclear fuels around the world is not
>a proliferation risk.
Hahahahahahahaha - was the RFP sent to the general public? Seems like
a rather obscure way to put forth "disinformation."
--
B. Alan Guthrie, III | Mene, mene, tekel, upharsin
alan.guthrie@nmd.pgh.wec.com |
Newsgroups: sci.environment
Subject: Re: Nuclear Power in Australia? Why not?
From: zcbag@cnfd.pgh.wec.com (B. Alan Guthrie)
Date: 24 Mar 1997 14:35:17 GMT
In article <33337415.3330@worldnet.att.net>,
Dennis Nelson <innrcrcl@worldnet.att.net> wrote:
>B. Alan Guthrie wrote:
>>
>> In article <332F9799.250F@worldnet.att.net>,
>> Dennis Nelson <innrcrcl@worldnet.att.net> wrote:
>> >B. Alan Guthrie wrote:
>> >>
>> >> In article <332A2F43.C7@worldnet.att.net>,
>> >> Dennis Nelson <innrcrcl@worldnet.att.net> wrote:
>> >> >B. Alan Guthrie wrote:
>> >> >>
>> >> >>
>> >>
>> >> <SNIP>
>> >>
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >This is a myth! Any combination of Pu isotopes can be made into a bomb
>> >> >> >Pure Pu-239 is, of course, the preference which accounts for the Green
>> >> >> >Run experiment/release at Hanford which was conducted to test detection
>> >> >> >methods to determine if the USSR was making plutonium from green fuels by
>> >> >> >measuring the effluents from their plutonium plants.
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> >Bomb designers can compensate for the other isotopes in their products.
>> >> >> >Pure Pu-239 bombs are safer to produce and handle because of their lower
>> >> >> >gamma emissions.
>> >> >> >
>> >> >>
>> >> >> No, I cannot make a bomb from pure Pu-240, so your assertion that
>> >> >> any combination of Pu isotopes can be made into a bomb (I assume
>> >> >> you mean a nuclear explosive device) is wrong. I remain persuaded
>> >> >> that any appreciable amount of Pu-240, in excess, say, of roughly
>> >> >> 20% of the isotopic abundance, will preclude the successful
>> >> >> construction and detonation of a weapon.
>> >> >>
>> >> >> What is a "green fuel?"
>> >> >>
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >> >OK, I plead guilty to being imprecise. I did not envision isotope
>> >> >separation of plutonium when I made the above statement. What I meant,
>> >> >but was not quite clear enough about, is that any degree of fuel burnup
>> >> >can be made into a bomb. The shorter time the breeder fertile species
>> >> >remains in the neutron flux the less plutonium will be created. That
>> >> >which is created, however, will be mostly Pu-239. If the fuel resides
>> >> >in the reactor longer there will be more total Pu but the isotopic
>> >> >composition shifts to the higher Pu isotopes. There is always enough
>> >> >fissionable isotopes in this gemisch to make a bomb.
>> >> >
>> >> >Green fuel is fuel which has remained in the core for less than a month;
>> >> >sometimes as little as two weeks. Plutonium extracted from this green
>> >> >fuel is almost pure Pu-239. Pu-240 does not remain constant but is
>> >> >transformed to Pu-241 and other higher isotopes in a continuous reactor
>> >> >flux.
>> >> >
>> >> >
>> >>
>> >> Sorry, I still don't buy it. The triggering of a plutonium bomb
>> >> is rather difficult. A neutron must be inserted at precisely the
>> >> correct instant. If it is inserted a little too soon or a little
>> >> too late, the device will not detonate properly. As more Pu-240
>> >> is present, one will have more neutrons from spontaneous fission,
>> >> thereby greatly complicating the bomb design. Maybe a very
>> >> sophisticated and experienced weapons lab could make a bomb from
>> >> using plutonium with a relatively large amount of plutonium. Maybe
>> >> not.
>> >
>> >
>> >I have heard it from the mouth of an eminent bomb designer, Ted Turner.
>> >Plutonium from spent reactor fuel of any burnup can be made into a bomb.
>> >Neutron insertion is provided by an initiator "walnut" in the plutonium
>> >pit. At the same time the implosion crushes the pit, the walnut (which
>> >consists of Po and Be powders in concentric layers separated by mylar
>> >or something) is also crushed, mixing the powders and causing a neutron
>> >burst. This inserts a few "$100" worth of reactivity at precisely the
>> >moment of maximum compression which detonates the bomb. Kind of like a
>> >spark plug for the bomb. Random neutron are not a problem as long as
>> >there are not too many of them.
>> >
>>
>> Last time I looked at Mr. Taylor's work (a couple of years ago), I
>> formed the distinct impression that he was on a *mission* and was
>> not willing to let reality interfere. I realize that the same
>> assertion can be made of me, so you need not make the obvious retort.
>>
>> Perhaps Mr. Taylor bamboozled you. Inserting neutrons into the
>> device does not insert reactivity.
>
>
>I made up the part about "a few $100 worth of reactivity" myself. You can't
>pin that on Turner. He said specifically that a bomb could be made from spent
>fuel from a power reactor. He didn't say specifically which degrees of burnup.
>So if the initiator does not intert reactivity, what do you call it?
The initiator inserts neutrons. The reactivity is in the configuration
of the fissile material - density, geometry.
Having spent the weekend thinking about Ted Taylor, I have remembered
why I am skeptical of his assertion regarding spent fuel from a power
reactor (more precisely, reactor grade plutonium). A couple of years
ago, I examined his writings, and I came to the conclusion that he
was referring to the experiment with the British spent-fuel based
plutonium. I believe that this fuel came from low burnup MAGNOX fuel,
which, being low burnup, would not have much Pu-240, and being from
a graphite reactor, would have less Pu-240 than fuel discharged from
an LWR at the same burnup.
So he was quite correct - a bomb had been made from plutonium produced
in a power reactor. Unfortunately, the extrapolation to LWR fuel was
not quite valid.
>> >While the odd numbered nuclides could spontaneously fission I doubt that
>> >applies to Pu-240. Random neutron emissions from fission or any other
>> >source could pose a problem of premature detonation, decreasing yield.
>>
>> The spontaneous fission rate for selected isotopes is
>>
>> Isotope Spontaneous fission
>> rate, dis/sec per
>> gram of isotope From
>>
>> U-235 3.13E-4 W. Myer, S. K. Loyalka,
>> W. E. Nelson, and R. W.
>> U-238 6.96E-3 Williams
>> "The Homemade Nuclear
>> Pu-239 1.02E-2 Bomb Syndrome"
>> Nuclear Safety (18)
>> Pu-240 4.52E+2 July-August, 1977
>> pp 427 - 438
>>
>
>
>All bombs have some fractional Pu-240 component. What are relative amounts of Pu isotopes
>at different fuel burnups? Pu-241 is even more fissionable than Pu-239. It is still a
>myth that Pu containing any Pu-240 cannot be made into a bomb. Perhaps at thermal neutron
>energies there is less Pu-240 formed than in high energy neutron breeder reactors.
I never said that a bomb could not have any Pu-240.
Pu-239 has a very broad resonance at a relatively low neutron energy. In
LWRs, there is a good chance that a neutron will be absorbed in this
resonance and convert the Pu-239 to Pu-240. For HWRs and graphite
moderated reactors, the neutron spectrum is more thermalized, and fewer
neutrons will be absorbed in this resonance, which is one reason why
HWRs and graphite-moderated reactors are used for Pu production purposes,
and LWRs are not.
>> >> The argument is made that in the early 1960s a device was made using
>> >> reactor grade plutonium. Upon digging into the matter, I determined
>> >> that the plutonium in question came from a British power reactor
>> >> which was graphite moderated. Thus, it is not clear to me whether
>> >> this plutonium was as contaminated with Pu-240 as LWR fuel at, say,
>> >> 30,000 MWD/MTU, which is low-burnup these days. Plutonim produced
>> >> in a graphite reactor will build in Pu-240 less quickly than an
>> >> LWR at the same burnup. I have a suspicion as well that the
>> >> British fuel was not at a very high burnup.
>> >
>> >
>> >I fail to see the significance of Pu-240. As long as the odd numbered
>> >nuclides are there in sufficient numbers you can make a bomb.
>> >
>>
>> The significance of Pu-240 lies in its spontaneous fission neutrons.
>>
>> The paper referenced above also notes that self-heating of reactor-
>> grade plutonium from radioactive decay is such that there would be
>> a 65 deg-C difference in temperature between the surface of the
>> putative device and the ambient air, thereby introducing other
>> difficulties in the design of the device.
>>
>> This paper also addresses the issues raised by Taylor.
>
>
>Maybe all they need to do is put it back in the reactor for a while to burn
>up the Pu-240.
No, because you will convert the Pu-239 to Pu-240. If you have already
separated the Pu from the uranium, then you will be producing no more
Pu-239, so your isotopics will get even worse.
>> >> Also, the US Department of Energy several years ago solicited
>> >> reactor designs for the inceneration of plutonium. The purpose
>> >> of these designs was to burn plutonium; the production of electricity
>> >> was an additional benefit. Fuel cycle costs were not a major
>> >> factor in the evaluation of the designs. A criterion of the
>> >> design spec was that the plutonium was to be burned such that
>> >> the isotopics were equivalent to PWR fuel at about 27,000 MWD/MTU.
>> >> I interpret this specification to mean that such isotopics are
>> >> unusable for weapons.
>> >>
>
>
>Perhaps this spec is based on radiation activity not fisibility.
No, there are cheaper ways to "spike" the stuff.
>> >Don't think so. It is probably more disinformation to convince the public
>> >that building reactors and shipping nuclear fuels around the world is not
>> >a proliferation risk.
>> >
>>
>> Hahahahahahahaha - was the RFP sent to the general public? Seems like
>> a rather obscure way to put forth "disinformation."
>>
>
>
>The government works in mysterious ways.
ROTFL (not that I doubt that the government works in mysterious ways)
--
B. Alan Guthrie, III | When the going gets tough,
| the tough hide under the table.
alan.guthrie@cnfd.pgh.wec.com |
| E. Blackadder
From: Steinn Sigurdsson <steinn@sandy.ast.cam.ac.uk>
Newsgroups: sci.space.policy,sci.physics,sci.environment,sci.energy,
alt.war.nuclear
Subject: Re: "Bomb-grade" fuel (Was: CASSINI stuff)
Date: 30 Oct 1997 11:29:21 +0000
zcbag@cnfd.pgh.wec.com (B. Alan Guthrie) writes:
> In article <careysub-2710971845510001@ip169.pom.primenet.com>,
> Carey Sublette <careysub@earthling.net> wrote:
> >A nuclear device made of "fuel grade plutonium" (for some reason provided
> >by Britain) was tested in Nevada in 1964. The identity of the specific
> >test, and the yield are still classified.
> I suspect that the reason for using UK fuel is that it was available.
> There were not a whole lot of power reactors operating in the USofA
> at the time. If one wishes to descend into speculation, then if
> a weapons lab was trying to make the point that "reactor grade"
> plutoniums was acceptable for weapons use, then the utilization of
> UK plutonium is a good selection since it is low burnup (my source
> says 3000 to 5000 MWD/MTU, rather than the 3000-4000 MWD/MTU which
> I cited yesterday) and will have good isotopics due to the soft
> neutron spectrum of graphite reactors.
If this is the same test I heard stories about, the reason
for using UK fuel was political. It was important that
US commercial fuel was not to be diverted to military use
but the designers wanted to test usability of (some) commercial
fuel. The US and UK already had an agreement to exchange materials
for testing, and the UK did not have the political constraints
of keeping the commercial programme separate from the military.
So they provided the fuel for the test, presumably in exchange
for some other favour.
From: zcbag@cnfd.pgh.wec.com (B. Alan Guthrie)
Newsgroups: sci.space.policy,sci.physics,sci.environment,sci.energy,
alt.war.nuclear
Subject: Re: "Bomb-grade" fuel (Was: CASSINI stuff)
Date: 28 Oct 1997 14:10:52 GMT
In article <thomsonaEIMz8w.37K@netcom.com>,
Allen Thomson <thomsona@netcom.com> wrote:
>In article <62tl4d$mqo$1@news.fsu.edu> jac@ibms48.scri.fsu.edu (Jim Carr) writes:
>
>>
>> Then there is the _weapons_grade_ U-235 and Pu-239, which each exist
>> in truly amazing quantities (tens of metric tons) in both the US and
>> Russia. Mix that down to low enrichment levels and you have a lot
>> of fuel for reactors of any type.
>
>
>[snip]
>
>Not really relevant to what you're saying, but it may be worth
>noting that the concepts of "weapons grade" U and Pu are kind
>of arbitrary, and are best understood to mean "isotopic compositions
>desirable, though not required, to build a military explosive."
>
>IIRC, uranium of more than about 20% enrichment will do, though
>you'd need a fair amount of it. Similarly, almost any obtainable
>grade of plutonium from normal reactor operations will suffice to make a
>bomb, though pre-ignition will tend to make the yield of some less
>predictable.
>
>See
>
>"Nuclear weapons and power-reactor plutonium" by Amory Lovins, Nature,
>Vol.283, 28 Feb 1980, pp. 817-823
Hardly my idea of a reputable reference. Lovins toots his own horn
quite well, but I remain unconvinced of his scientific qualifications.
>
>and
>
>"Explosive Properties of Reactor-Grade Plutonium" by J. Carson Mark,
>Science and Global Security, 1993, Vol. 4, pp. 111-128.
>
>
>Also IIRC, during an earlier round of proliferation worries,
>Livermore designed a couple of bombs using plutonium obtained
>from fuel burned to commercial levels, and may have demonstrated
>one in Nevada.
Turns out that this heralded device was built with plutonium
obtained from a UK graphite-moderated power reactor which had
a burnup of maybe 3000 or 4000 MWD/MTU. As fuel is burned,
higher isotopes of plutonium, notably Pu-240, build in in
greater relative fractions. At burnups of 3000 to 4000
MWD/MTU, the plutonium is still relatively pure Pu-239 (in
a PWR spectrum, the plutonium is about 94% fissile plutonium).
PWR fuel is presently being burned to over 60,000 MWD/MTU (at
a burnup of 47,000, the plutonium is about 66% fissile plutonium).
The neutron spectrum of a graphite reactor should generate
plutonium with a higher fraction of fissile isotopes for a given
burnup.
(Fissile isotopes of plutonium, such as Pu-239 and Pu-241, are
wanted for nuclear weapons; the non-fissile isotopes, Pu-240 and
Pu-242, are undesirable and, at least in the case of Pu-240,
have higher background levels of neutron emission, resulting in
considerable complications for weapons design.)
So, it is not clear to me just what the "reactor grade plutonium
device" stunt proved. The isotopics are not representative of
commercial fuel.
I have not read Dr Mark's paper, I confess, and I shall try to see
if I can find it.
--
B. Alan Guthrie, III | Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?
|
alan.guthrie@cnfd.pgh.wec.com | My opinions only
|
From: zcbag@cnfd.pgh.wec.com (B. Alan Guthrie)
Newsgroups: sci.space.policy,sci.physics,sci.environment,sci.energy,
alt.war.nuclear
Subject: Re: "Bomb-grade" fuel (Was: CASSINI stuff)
Date: 30 Oct 1997 19:45:24 GMT
In article <careysub-2910971751440001@ip242.pom.primenet.com>,
Carey Sublette <careysub@earthling.net> wrote:
>In article <634rpc$1d3u@sccat.pgh.wec.com>, zcbag@cnfd.pgh.wec.com (B.
>Alan Guthrie) wrote:
>...
>>
>> Turns out that this heralded device was built with plutonium
>> obtained from a UK graphite-moderated power reactor which had
>> a burnup of maybe 3000 or 4000 MWD/MTU. As fuel is burned,
>> higher isotopes of plutonium, notably Pu-240, build in in
>> greater relative fractions. At burnups of 3000 to 4000
>> MWD/MTU, the plutonium is still relatively pure Pu-239 (in
>> a PWR spectrum, the plutonium is about 94% fissile plutonium).
>> PWR fuel is presently being burned to over 60,000 MWD/MTU (at
>> a burnup of 47,000, the plutonium is about 66% fissile plutonium).
>> The neutron spectrum of a graphite reactor should generate
>> plutonium with a higher fraction of fissile isotopes for a given
>> burnup.
>>
>> (Fissile isotopes of plutonium, such as Pu-239 and Pu-241, are
>> wanted for nuclear weapons; the non-fissile isotopes, Pu-240 and
>> Pu-242, are undesirable and, at least in the case of Pu-240,
>> have higher background levels of neutron emission, resulting in
>> considerable complications for weapons design.)
>>
>> So, it is not clear to me just what the "reactor grade plutonium
>> device" stunt proved. The isotopics are not representative of
>> commercial fuel.
>
>
>If you are right about the method of production of the test plutonium (and
>I don't think there is available information to support it) then I believe
>you have got your plutonium composition figures wrong. Your plutonium
>figures are much too good for the burn-ups you suggest. 100 MWD produce
>about 0.9% Pu-240 (this was what was used in the Fat Man bomb), 400 MWD
>produces about 3% Pu-240, in the commercial high burn-up range typical
>compositions are:
>
>MAGNOX Reactor
> 3000 MWD 5000 MWD
>
>Pu-238 0.1% -
>Pu-239 80.0% 68.5%
>Pu-240 16.9% 25.0%
>Pu-241 2.7% 5.3%
>Pu-242 0.3% 1.2%
>(Source OECD Nuclear Energy Agency)
>
>Anything over 3000 MWD burnup will produce reactor-grade plutonium.
I find these numbers hard to accept. My values were for a typical
Westinghouse three-loop PWR. I do not see how differences in
the neutron spectrum can account for the differences in our citations
(particularly as I expect the MAGNOX fuel to have less parasitic
absorption in the Pu-239).
>
>The composition of the 1962 test material is not precisely known, the U.S.
>has announced only that the device used reactor-grade plutonium.
>Unfortunately this has created a large ambiguity since in 1962 (when the
>test took place) this merely meant >7% Pu-240, but when the public
>announcement initially was made (1977) it meant >18% Pu-240. The U.S. made
>an announcement in 1994 that reiterated the 1977 announcement:
>"A successful test was conducted in 1962, which used reactor-grade
>plutonium in the nuclear explosive in place of weapon-grade plutonium. "
>
>Certain parties (many of whom happen to have a vesterd interest in
>beleiving that civilian nuclear power has no proliferation implications)
>assert that the 1977 and 1994 statements only mean that reactor-grade
>plutonium as defined *at that time* were used in the 1962 test (e.g. the
>Pu-240 content could have been only 7.000001% Pu-240), and conclude that
>therefore this test has no relevance to plutonium currently produced in
>civilian reactors.
>
>However the U.S. made an additional statement in 1994:
>" The United States maintains an extensive nuclear test data base and
>predictive capabilities. This information, combined with the results of
>this low yield test, reveals that weapons can be constructed with
>reactor-grade plutonium. "
I take statements made by the present Administration regarding nuclear
power with a grain of salt.
>
>This is a new assertion, which is not simply a description of an
>historical event. Regardless of the actual composition of the 1962 device,
>it is asserting right now that reactor grade plutonium can be used in a
>nuclear device. The reference to "predictive capabilities" could be read
>as meaning that weapon modelling capabilities corroborate what was
>demonstrated in the test; or it could be interpreted as implicitly
>acknowledging that the 1962 test would not qualify as "reactor grade"
>under current standards and that extrapolation is needed to justify the
>position that reactor grade as currently defined can be used.
>
>It is not really important for current policy questions to differentiate
>between these two possibilities. Regardless, it should be clear that the
>U.S. government has made an official declaration that weapons using
>plutonium with >18% Pu-240 can be made into weapons.
>
>Nonetheless, there is still a dedicated "bob and weave" faction that is
>dedicated to making contorted readings of the announcement and attempt to
>claim that the 1994 statement is still applying a 1962 standard (for no
>apparent reason).
>
>An example is the critique offered by reactor physicist Alexander De Volpi at:
>http://physics.wm.edu/~sher/aoct96.html#a2
>
>De Volpi appears to beleive that there is sort of a conspiracy by the U.S.
>government to disseminate misleading information that is damaging to
>civilian nuclear power. This is somewhat odd on the face of it, since for
>the past 30 odd years the government has generally been a booster of same.
>
>I actually agree with the overall thrust of his complaints - which is that
>more information about this test should be made public, and really no
>damage to non-proliferation efforts will result by the disclosure.
>
>He believes however, that it will prove that weapons *cannot* be
>effectively made using reactor grade plutonium - contradicting the public
>position of the U.S. government. His reasons for believing this seem
>exceedingly weak (such as his assertion that a low kiloton yield - i.e. a
>tremedously destructive device by any normal human standard - for the 1962
>test would be very *discouraging* to proliferators).
>
>See the rejoinder by Miller and Von Hippel:
>http://physics.wm.edu/~sher/cjul97.html#a1
>
>Thanks to James Carr for pointing me to these URLs!
>
>
>>
>> I have not read Dr Mark's paper, I confess, and I shall try to see
>> if I can find it.
>>
>
>You can also email the Nuclear Control Institute (they have a web page)
>and ask them for JC Mark's paper which he did for them (probably very
>similar content).
>
On the other hand, when the US Department of Energy recently solicited
proposals for burning plutonium in LWRs, the bid spec specified a final
plutonium composition which, as I recall, corresponded to a PWR burnup
of roughly 27,000 MWD/MTU, which leads me to believe that the proliferation
potential of fuel above this burnup is limited, at best.
--
B. Alan Guthrie, III | Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?
|
alan.guthrie@cnfd.pgh.wec.com | My opinions only
|
From: zcbag@cnfd.pgh.wec.com (B. Alan Guthrie)
Newsgroups: sci.space.policy,sci.physics,sci.environment,sci.energy,
alt.war.nuclear
Subject: Re: "Bomb-grade" fuel (Was: CASSINI stuff)
Date: 30 Oct 1997 14:05:03 GMT
In article <3456A040.57E388A4@interaccess.com>,
Paul Dietz <dietz@interaccess.com> wrote:
>B. Alan Guthrie wrote:
>
>> I note that "advanced weapons designs" are needed to use "reactor
>> grade plutonium." The proliferation risk, it seems to me, is not
>> from this stuff. A nation capable of advanced weapons design
>> should be able to get access to "weapons grade plutonium."
>
>Granted on the first sentence. However, "advanced" doesn't
>necessarily mean "hard". The bombs of the early 1960s were
>designed with the help of rather primitive computers. Any
>desktop machine today is far more powerful. Would-be bomb
>makers have access to better software and nuclear data as well.
>
>While a nation capable of advanced weapons design is able to
>get access to "weapons grade" plutonium, availability of
>other Pu supplies would reduce the time needed to break out
>of a control regime.
I freely admit to not being a weapons designer, but I think
that there is more to weapons design and fabrication than
computers and software. I certainly do agree that the
computational resources are much advanced over the early
1960s, but I also note that these designs were performed by
labs with twenty years experience and rather formidable
resources.
I am not going to argue that the individual US physicist
is more capable than the individual Iraqi or Pakistani or
whatever your country of choice physicist. However, I do
think that the role of the institution (the weapons lab,
for instance) is important.
--
B. Alan Guthrie, III | Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?
|
alan.guthrie@cnfd.pgh.wec.com | My opinions only
|
From: zcbag@cnfd.pgh.wec.com (B. Alan Guthrie)
Newsgroups: sci.space.policy,sci.physics,sci.environment,sci.energy,
alt.war.nuclear
Subject: Re: "Bomb-grade" fuel (Was: CASSINI stuff)
Date: 3 Nov 1997 13:54:51 GMT
In article <63a7lp$3ss$1@news.fsu.edu>,
Jim Carr <jac@ibms48.scri.fsu.edu> wrote:
>zcbag@cnfd.pgh.wec.com (B. Alan Guthrie) wrote:
>}...
>} Turns out that this heralded device was built with plutonium
>} obtained from a UK graphite-moderated power reactor which had
>} a burnup of maybe 3000 or 4000 MWD/MTU. ...
>
> According to the article published by Miller and von Hippel in
> July, such information has not been declassified. However, they
> argue that (having access to it themselves) that it is not relevant.
>
Given that it is known that the material came from a
UK power reactor, it is not too difficult to determine
how high the burnup could have been. The exact isotopics
may be classified, but the technically-competent oberver
can make a pretty good guess (and, of course, Drs Carr
and Sublette are both pretty darn good technically).
<SNIP>
--
B. Alan Guthrie, III | Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?
|
alan.guthrie@cnfd.pgh.wec.com | My opinions only
|
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